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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Was the jury's verdict of no cause of action 
so against the substantial weight of evidence that such verdict 
should not stand? 
Standard of Review; "If there is any substantial 
competent evidence upon which a jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could make the findings it should stand. But if the 
findings is so plainly unreasonable as to convince the court 
that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the 
findings, it cannot be said to be supported by substantial 
evidence." Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138 
(Utah 1982) (citing Sevbold v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 239 
P.2d 174 (Utah 1951)). 
Issue 2: Did the district court err in denying the 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of all previous 
injuries suffered by Plaintiff unless such injuries related 
directly to the injury or disability which was at issue in this 
case? 
Standard of Review: "In reviewing a trial court's 
ruling on admissibility of evidence under Rule 403, [the Supreme 
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Court] will not overturn the court's determination unless it was 
an 'abuse of discretion.'" State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 
(Utah 1992) . Accordingly, the Supreme Court reviews "the trial 
court's 403 ruling admitting or denying admission to evidence by 
deciding whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision 
that xthe unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence 
outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was beyond 
the limits of reasonability." Id. (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991). " [L]ike any other evidentiary 
ruling, an erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence based 
on Rule 4 03 cannot result in reversible error unless the error 
is harmful. Id. (citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989) . 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. Determinative Law: 
a. Constitutional Provisions: There are no 
constitutional provisions upon which the Appellant relies. 
b. Statutes: There are no determinative statutes upon 
which the Appellant relies. 
c. Case Law: 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an Amended Judgment entered on April 
28, 1995, wherein the Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint 
after the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action against 
the Plaintiff. 
B. Course of Proceeding and Disposition 
On April 21, 1992, Plaintiff, Louis Ortiz, filed a personal 
injury complaint against Geneva Rock Products for injuries 
sustained in an incident on June 4, 1991. (R. 1-4). Prior to 
trial, Plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine to restrict, inter 
alia, Defendant's introduction of any evidence relating to prior 
injuries suffered by Plaintiff which were not directly related 
to the injuries and/or disabilities complained of in the instant 
case. (R. 65). That motion was denied. (R. ). 
A jury trial was conducted from September 21-23, 1995, in 
the case at bar. At the conclusion of the case, Plaintiff moved 
for a directed verdict on the issue of liability. (R. 667) . 
The trial court denied that motion. (R. 668) . The jury 
returned a special verdict, finding no negligence on the part of 
the Defendant. (R. 213-15). Plaintiff made a Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the alternative, 
Motion for New Trial. (R. 279-286). The trial court denied 
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that motion. (R. 2 92-94). An Amended Judgment dismissing 
Plaintiff's complaint was entered by the District Court on April 
28, 1995. (R. 310-12). Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on 
May 4, 1994. (R. 341-42). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 4, 1991, Plaintiff, Louis Ortiz, worked as an 
employee of Lowell Construction Company pouring and forming 
concrete for sidewalks. (R. 378-79) . While pouring cement that 
morning, the chute on the cement truck "froze up" and therefore 
could not be moved from side to side or around objects. (R. 
383) . The "lead man" on the project, Gary Cisneros, notified 
the driver of the truck that the chute needed to be fixed 
immediately or another truck was required. (R. 3 84). 
Upon moving the truck to the next location, the driver and 
a mechanic commenced working on the chute controls, attempting 
to fix or unstick the controls. The driver was in the cab of 
the truck and the mechanic was leaning in the driver's side 
window. (R. 386) . During this time, the Plaintiff stood in the 
work area, which is a reasonable and appropriate location for a 
cement worker to stand while waiting for a pour. (R. 385, 398, 
412, 417) . Without any warning from the truck driver or the 
mechanic (R. 389, 401, 653), the chute suddenly swung around and 
hit the Plaintiff across the back, knocking him over the forms. 
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The force of the blow lifted Ortiz off his feet, and catapulted 
him approximately ten (10) feet onto a nearby lawn. (R. 387-
88) . 
It is not common practice to work on the controls of the 
cement truck wile the truck is "fully chuted." Instead, it is 
generally accepted that the chute should be "broken down" prior 
to attempting repairs on the controls, or the truck should be 
removed from the site. (R. 389-90, 415, 417, 659). Further, 
the cement truck driver is responsible for the location of the 
chute and it is his responsibility to keep the chute out of the 
workers' area. (R. 399, 417, 656-57). 
Here, the mechanic and the driver were looking inside the 
cab of the truck and neither they, nor anyone associated with 
them, were watching the chute while they experimented with the 
controls. (R. 390, 391, 659). The mechanic had no experience 
in driving a cement truck or finishing cement (R. 656); and he 
did not view the situation previously described as "dangerous" 
and therefore did not attempt to warn the Plaintiff to move from 
the area. (R. 653). Finally, the mechanic acknowledged that 
the driver of the truck bore the ultimate responsibility for 
controlling the cement chute (R. 656-57), and that the chute 
could have been "broken down" or taken apart before he and the 
driver began blindly manipulating the controls. (R. 659). 
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As a result of the foregoing, the Plaintiff suffered 
extensive injuries to his spine which resulted in long term 
disability (R. 490, 495-96) as well as extreme and ongoing pain. 
(R. 4 93) . Consequently, the Plaintiff has been unable to work 
in the construction field since June 4, 1991.1 (R. 554-55). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue 1. The jury disregarded the overwhelming and 
uncontroverted evidence that the Defendant was negligent in: 
(1) attempting to repair the cement truck chute in close 
proximity to the Defendant and other employees; and (2) failing 
to warn those employees within the purview of the chute of the 
dangerous condition that existed; and that as a direct and 
proximate result of such negligence, Plaintiff suffered 
permanent and irreparable injuries. 
Issue 2. Any evidence regarding Plaintiff's prior 
accidents/injuries that are not somehow related to the injuries 
sustained in the instant case should have been excluded pursuant 
to Rule 402 and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in denying 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine. 
The Plaintiff testified that the construction field is 
all that he knew. (R. 555). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY DISREGARDED THE ONLY COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE AS TO DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE, 
CONSEQUENTLY, THE VERDICT CANNOT STAND. 
It is well settled that: 
Determination of facts is left exclusively to the jury 
. . . [and] [t]he only limitation thereon is that if 
findings [or verdict] are made which are not supported 
by any substantial evidence, or the evidence is so 
clear that all reasonable minds would find one way, so 
that a verdict contrary thereto must have resulted 
from passion or prejudice, or misconception of the law 
or the evidence, or in arbitrary disregard thereof, 
the court will exercise its inherent supervisory 
powers to administer justice, and will set the verdict 
aside. 
Lemmon v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 341 P.2d 
215, 220-21 (Utah 1959); accord Rees v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1079 (Utah 1991); Batty v. Mitchell, 
575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978); Onveabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 
787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App. 1990). 
In the instant case, the overwhelming and virtually 
uncontroverted evidence was that the Defendant and/or its 
employees or agents were negligent as alleged by the Plaintiff 
in his complaint. Specifically, the only competent evidence 
adduced at trial is that Defendant's employees negligently 
attempted to repair a cement truck chute in close proximity to 
the Plaintiff and other employees and that in the process of 
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doing so negligently allowed the chute to swing and strike the 
Plaintiff without any warning whatsoever. In an effort to 
demonstrate the prodigious evidence that was introduced at 
trial, the Plaintiff will marshall all the evidence that goes to 
the specific issue of negligence. 
First, Gary Cisneros, the lead man on the project, 
testified as follows: 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel]. And when you 
finished pouring -- excuse me -- strike that. Did you 
have any difficulties with the chute at that time when 
you were pouring down the street? 
A. [Cisneros} Yeah, we had just started pouring 
and the chute froze up so we couldn't move it from 
side to side or around objects. This particular area 
where we were working down the street has more trees 
and there was more vehicles that were in the way and 
that is why I notified the driver that we needed to 
either get another truck there or get the chute fixed 
cause we can't, you know, move it by hand. 
Q. Now would you describe for the jury at the 
time the chute struck Mr. Ortiz, where were you? 
A. I was approximately where the X is, sitting on 
the grass. 
Q. Where was Mr. Ortiz? 
A. Mr. Ortiz was in the pour area. He was like 
racking mud for us and you get a lot of concrete on 
your boots and stuff and a lot of people in the 
neighborhood frown when you are standing on their lawn 
with concrete on your shoes and it will kill their 
lawns with the lime and what not in it you know. He 
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was in his work area in between two points, which is 
very close to where this is. . . . 
Q. Now at the time just prior to the time that 
the chute hit Mr. Ortiz, did you know where the driver 
and the mechanic were? 
A. Yeah I do. 
Q. Where were they? 
A. The driver was in the cab, which is in the 
center of the truck, and the mechanic was in his, 
which would be his driver's side window, and they were 
playing with the controls or trying to fix the 
controls, get them unlocked. 
Q. Would you describe what happened when this 
chute began to move or just prior to its moving. 
Would you describe to the jury what you remember about 
this incident? 
A. I remember the mechanic and the driver messing 
with the controls inside and it did not move any or 
nothing. And then I looked up cause I seen the chute 
coming across, and what I seen -- I think I was 
talking to Mr. Ortiz at the time and I seen the chute 
coming behind him. And it just swung free. It swung 
free and hit him, knocked him over the forms and then 
the mechanic and the driver were concerned if he was 
all right, saying that they didn't think the chute 
would swing that far. 
Q. Did you hear the driver or the mechanic tell 
you or Mr. Ortiz to move out of this area? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. What in your judgment should have been done to 
avoid this problem with the chute? 
A. Well, if it was me personally, I would have 
broke the chute down knowing that you were going to 
work on it cause I know it is not a common practice to 
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be fully chuted and working on your truck. It should 
have been broke down to the end chute, which could 
only swing in front of the truck and not even barely 
clear the bumpers. 
Q. Now you say that is common practice. Why is 
that? 
A. You don't want to be fully extended in the 
instance of hitting things. I mean, even like in an 
instance like that, if it went the other way it would 
have swung out into traffic or, you know, it is just 
a big hazard. You can hit cars. You need to break 
them down if you are going to work on them. 
Q. In this case that was not done? 
A. No, it wasn't. 
Q. Both individuals were in the truck. Were they 
looking outside the vehicle at all? 
A. No, they were both looking inside of the 
vehicle which is probably another thing I would have 
done is got one of them out of there instead of having 
four people dealing with something, four hands dealing 
with something, there would only be two. 
Q. Did you hear any warning from those 
individuals? 
A. No, I hadn't. 
Q. About the chute breaking loose? 
A. No. 
(R. 383-392). 
Q. [By Defense counsel]. Did Mr. Ortiz need to 
be standing where he was because concrete was being 
poured? 
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A. [By Mr. Cisneros] . No, he didn't. He was 
just standing in the sidewalk where we were getting 
ready to pour, like I had mentioned previously. . . . 
He was in his work area and that is where he needed to 
be. 
Q. So let me understand this. You say it is 
whose responsibility to the end of the chute? 
A. It would be the driver's. 
Q. And is it your responsibility to stay out of 
the way of the chute as a worker? 
A. Not as much as it is the driver's responsi-
bility to watch for workers. 
Q. When a truck is broken though, don't you think 
you ought to take a little more caution for yourself? 
The truck is broken and you are trying to get it to 
swing one way or the other. Isn't that outside the 
normal circumstance you had of foresight? 
A. No, because I have dealt with a lot of broken 
trucks before and some of the drivers break their 
chutes down if it is the chute that is broke. Or our 
biggest instance is with Geneva. We get rid of the 
truck and get another one there. 
Q. And if he doesn't break his chute down, do you 
move out of the way? 
A. Generally not. 
(R. 394-402). 
Further, George Padgen, a former employer of the Plaintiff 
as well as a superintendent of concrete for twenty-three years, 
testified: 
Q. [Plaintiff's counsel]. Assume, if you will, 
that that is the pour area where this vehicle is going 
11 
to be pouring next. Would you do that? And assume 
further that the vehicle itself and the employees, the 
driver and the employees were having trouble, a 
problem with this chute in moving it back and forth, 
assume that they were having some difficulty with that 
chute. And assume further that a mechanic was called 
from Geneva Rock and he was going to work with or try 
to repair this chute so that it could be moved to 
continue the pour. Do you have an opinion, Mr. 
Padjen, as to whether or not it would be unreasonable 
for an individual to be standing in the pour area at 
the time they are working on part of the vehicle 
chute? 
A. I see nothing wrong with anybody standing 
there unless the driver or the mechanic was to say, 
"Get out of the way." But on one of my particular 
jobs and that was my truck, I wouldn't wait for them 
to bring a mechanic out. I would have shipped the 
truck off and told them to bring me another one, and 
when they got this fixed to bring it back, but I won't 
even allow it to be there. 
411-12) 
Q. [By Defense counsel] . In this case [the 
truck] wasn't removed and Mr. Ortiz chose to stand in 
an area where the chute could hit him while they are 
trying to repair it. You don't see a problem with 
that? 
A. Not if he wasn't warned. You never know on 
one of these trucks. I have had a lot of chute 
problems over the years. I have seen chutes run 
through forms. I have seen them hit people. Up until 
15 years ago, we used to run our own chutes. Now the 
driver runs them. We used to run our own chute. The 
driver is the one that returns the chute now, so you 
are at his mercy as far as him running the chute when 
you are pouring. 
417) . 
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Finally, the Defendant testified as follows: 
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel]. There are some 
marks on that exhibit, but would you briefly in your 
own words tell the jury what happened just prior to 
that chute striking you in the back. Tell the jury 
where you had been and what happened? 
A. [By Plaintiff]. Well, I had -- the mechanic 
had come on the job and they said they were going to 
fix the chute. I just walked in my work area. That 
is where I worked. That is where I raked, that is of 
my work area and I was just sitting on the shovel, had 
my back to the truck and after that I don't know where 
the mechanic was. I don't know where the driver was. 
All I know is the chute hit me, and I flew over the 
forms. I did fly over. I don't know how high off the 
ground I went. I ended up landing right there. 
Q. What did the driver, mechanic, you don't 
recall any conversation from them? 
A. The only thing I recall was after the chute 
had hit me, I don't know which one it was, had ran up 
to me and asked if I was all right. They said they 
had pulled a pin, from somewhere on the chute they had 
pulled a pin and the chute started swinging and they 
thought it was going to stop and it did not stop and 
that is when it hit me, I guess. 
Q. Did you hear anybody attempt to warn you of 
the movement of the chute? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. When you moved into the location in the 
sidewalk area where you have got "me" designated, next 
to that MX' on Exhibit P-2, did the mechanic tell you 
not to stay in that area? 
A. No. 
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Q. Did the driver tell you not to stay in that 
area? 
A. No. 
Q. Did they tell you what they were going to do? 
A. Yes, I knew they were going to work on the 
chute, yes. 
Q. Did they tell you specifically what they were 
going to do? 
A. They didn't tell me what they were going to do 
to fix the chute. They just mentioned they were going 
to work on the chute, yes, that is all. 
Q. You ever have an occasion when Geneva Rock has 
taken a truck off of the location for repair under 
these same circumstances? 
A. I don't know if it was for repairing the chute 
but they have. In my previous experience they had 
backed up away from where everybody was working and 
worked on the truck, yes. 
Q. What facts, if any, did you have at that time 
which would make you concerned about the chute at all? 
A. I had no idea it was going to swing. I was 
just in my work area. I had no idea. I know it 
swings back and forth, yes, I am not stupid of that, 
but I had no idea it was going to swing at that time, 
you know, freely like it did. 
534- 541) . 
The foregoing testimony along with corroborative evidence 
the only competent testimony that went solely to the issue 
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of Defendant's negligence.2 In fact, each of the witnesses 
consistently testified that the employee's actions in attempting 
to repair the broken chute in the work area was not within 
accepted or industry standards and that the more appropriate 
remedial measures would have been to break the chute down or 
remove the truck from the work area during the repair. Further, 
not only did the fact witnesses testify that it was wholly 
acceptable for the Plaintiff to remain in the work area while 
the truck was undergoing repair, but that it would have been 
incumbent on the driver of the truck or the mechanic to 
safeguard against any accidents involving the cement truck and 
workers. Finally, the witnesses, including those associated 
with the defense, consistently testified that neither the driver 
The only scintilla of evidence introduced by the defense 
was the testimony of Stephen Barnes, the mechanic, who 
was called in to repair the broken chute. The only 
relevant testimony on the issue of negligence is that: 
(1) he did not see a crew in the work area (R. 646); and 
(2) he did not believe that he had any duty to check to 
see if any workers were in the area. (R. 653). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the mechanic acknowledged 
that it would have been wiser had the sections been 
broken down (R. 659) and that no warnings were ever 
provided to the Plaintiff by him or the driver. 
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nor the mechanic ever warned the Plaintiff that a pin had been 
pulled and the chute was swinging.3 
Inasmuch as the testimony and evidence in this case was 
uniform and uncontradicted as to Defendant's negligence, the 
verdict in the instant case was certainly reached as a result of 
a misconception of the factual evidence or an arbitrary 
disregard thereof. Accordingly, this court should vacate such 
verdict and enter one consistent with the uncontroverted 
evidence at trial. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 
OF OTHER INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
IN UNRELATED INCIDENTS WHICH WERE NOT SOMEHOW 
RELATED TO THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
IN THE CASE AT BAR. 
In his Motion in Limine, Plaintiff argued that the 
foregoing evidence should be excluded under Rule 4 02 and Rule 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 665-670) . The court 
denied that motion. 
Rule 4 02 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States of the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
In fact, the mechanic testified that he watched the chute 
swing and hit the Plaintiff without ever providing any 
form of warning. 
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statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah R. Evid. 4 02 (emphasis added). 
Further, Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff had, prior to the accident 
of June 4, 1991, suffered injuries to his ankle, shoulder and 
upper neck. However, as argued in Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, 
none of these injuries had affected Plaintiff's lower back, the 
injury at issue in the case at bar, and none of the injuries had 
rendered the Plaintiff unable to work.4 Notwithstanding, the 
court denied Plaintiff's Motion in Limine and ultimately allowed 
the evidence to be adduced at trial. 
Here, inasmuch as the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff 
in prior incidents were wholly unrelated to the injury at issue 
in this case, namely Plaintiff's lower back injury, such 
evidence is not relevant and therefore inadmissible under Rule 
402 of the Rules of Evidence. Notwithstanding, in the event 
These facts were confirmed by witnesses at trial. 
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that the court determined that such evidence had some limited 
relevance, the only purpose that introduction of the sane would 
accomplish would be unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
and misleading the jury. In other terms, such evidence would 
only be introduced as a smoke screen to shift the focus from the 
medically substantiated injury sustained by the Plaintiff to 
other unrelated injuries which are not dispositive of the issues 
at the heart of this case. 
Finally, in the event that introduction of the foregoing 
evidence was to prove that Plaintiff suffered from a pre-
existing condition which was aggravated by the accident of June 
4, 1991, such would not be sufficiently relevant to overcome the 
limitations set forth in Rules 402 or 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
The rule is well settled that when a defendant's 
negligence aggravates or lights up a latent, dormant, 
or asymptomatic condition, or one to which the injured 
person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to the 
injured person for the full amount of damages which 
ensue, notwithstanding such diseased or weakened 
condition. In other words, when a latent condition 
itself does not cause pain, but that condition plus an 
injury brings on pain by aggravating the pre-existing 
condition, then the injury, not the dormant condition, 
is the proximate cause of the pain and disability. A 
plaintiff, therefore is entitled to recover all 
damages which actually and necessarily follow the 
injury. 
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987). 
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In the case at bar, even had the defense offered the 
foregoing evidence to demonstrate that Plaintiff suffered from 
a pre-existing condition, it would not necessarily be relevant 
to the instant case since under Biswell, the Defendant would 
still be liable for the full amount of damages sustained by 
Plaintiff as a result of its negligence. Accordingly, all such 
evidence relating to injuries sustained by Plaintiff in previous 
unrelated accidents should have been excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the jury's verdict and the court's 
amended judgment should be set aside. Alternatively, this court 
should determine that the court abused its discretion in denying 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine and remand this case for a new 
trial with instructions to bar all such evidence relating to 
injuries sustained by Plaintiff in previous unrelated accidents. 
DATED this 22 day of November, 1996. 
MATT^BILJANIC / / 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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APPELLANT, postage prepaid thereon to: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS ORTIZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS, INC., 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CASE NO. 920902256 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of 
the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of 
the issue presented, answer "yes." If you find the evidence is so 
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the 
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented, answer "no." Also, any damages assessed must 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Was the defendant, Geneva Rock Products, negligent as 
alleged by plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No ^ 
2. Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
M <« 0 /. JL O  
-2-
3. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent, as alleged by 
the defendant? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
4. Was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
5. If you have answered both Questions 1 and 4 "yes," then, 
and only then, answer the following question: Assuming all the 
negligence that proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries to 
total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. Plaintiff Louis Ortiz % 
B. Defendant Geneva Rock Products % 
TOTAL 100 % 
6. If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "yes," state the 
amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the 
plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of. If 
such questions were not answered "yes,11 do not answer this 
question. 
-3-
Special Damages: 
A. Past Special Damages $_ 
B. Future Special Damages $_ 
General Damages: $_ 
TOTAL $_ 
DATED this J\j^ day of September, 1994. 
FOREpERSQN 
^ 0 
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ADDENDUM B 
GEORGE T. NAEGLE [A5001] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS ORTIZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS, 
Defendant. 
INC. , 
Civil 
Judge 
JUDGMENT 
No. 920902256 PI 
Tyrone E. Medley 
This matter came on for a trial by jury on September 21 
through September 23, 1994 with the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
presiding. The jury heard the evidence of the respective parties 
and the argument of counsel, and having been submitted a Special 
Verdict and having answered the questions contained on the 
Special Verdict Form as follows: 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the evidence 
preponderates in favor of the issues presented, answer "Yes." If 
you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot 
( 
RLE r^ Tf^ rrr r^&r 
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determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that 
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer 
lfNo.n Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence, 
1. Was the defendant, Geneva Rock Products, negligent 
as alleged by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
Having answered "No," to Question No. 1, the jury 
answered no further questions on the Special Verdict Form and it 
was signed by Mr. Porter who was acting as foreperson. 
Accordingly, the jury has returned a verdict of no 
cause of action and judgment is entered in accordance with that 
jury verdict for no cause of action. The plaintiff's Complaint 
against the defendant is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon 
the merits, and the prevailing party, the defendant is hereby 
awarded costs of $ 
. V, . " /7... 7) 
1995. DATED this 3j< day of 
BY'THE COURT: 
U ^ "7^6^ 
Tfcte Honorable Tyro 
District Court Ju"' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on 
this f/jfl day of April , 1995, to the following: 
Matt Biljanic 
7355 South 900 East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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MATT BILJANIC A0323 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
7355 South 9th East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Phone: 255-3576 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS ORTIZ, 
Plaintiff, and Appellant 
vs. 
GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS, INC., 
Defendant, and Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 920902256PI 
(Trial Court) 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
1. Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and 
Appellant, Louis Ortiz, through counsel, Matt Biljanic, 
appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley entered in this matter on the 6th 
day of December, 1994. 
2. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment, 
including the Court's ruling on Plaintiff!s Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial and 
judgment for costs entered April 5, 1995 and the subsequent 
judgment entered April 28, 1995. 
DATED this 7 day of ,1995, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal and Undertaking on 
Appeal to George T. Naegle, Attorney for Defendant, Key Bank 
Tower, Seventh Floor, 50 South Main Street, P.O. Box 24 65, 
of 7)\ftc^ . 1995-
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, postage prepaid, this J/_^_day 
f 
MATT BILJANjfC ~\ 
